For a generation, people in Kathmandu have been waiting for a large drinking water diversion project to relieve them of a severe water shortage. Recounting the history of the Melamchi Water Supply Project through interviews, project documentation and media reports, the article argues that an analysis of unfinished infrastructure has to take into account the recalcitrance of more-than-human forms, in particular matter like water and rock, as well as institutions like government ministries and international donor agencies. In the case of Melamchi, the lack of control over both matter and such institutional actors delayed the completion of the project -as is the case with a number of large-scale hydropower projects in the country. Despite this obvious inability to complete infrastructures, elites have built the promise of a prosperous future for Nepal on its water resources and the export of electricity. By conceptualizing Melamchi as an infrastructural meshwork in Ingold's understanding and Nepal as an unfinished hydraulic state, I aim to contribute to the growing literature complicating Wittfogel's idea of the hydrosocial.
unattractive and a waste of time and money.
Melamchi is a prime example of a much larger condition permeating many sectors of public and private life in Nepal that Heather Hindman (2014) has called "long-term provisionality." What this term aptly captures is the fact that the conventional framing of these situations through the idiom of crisis is not doing justice to their open-endedness and the unlikelihood of their resolution (Roitman, 2013) . Melamchi stands out among the host of unbuilt, delayed, unfinished or suspended infrastructures throughout the country because it had the potential to be more than an expensive solution to the water scarcity in Kathmandu, but a multi-purpose project. This option was developed by a group of water activists who, despite their initial critique of the project, felt confident that through their integration of a hydropower and an irrigation component, the project would gain economic viability and counterbalance the fact that Melamchi will only benefit the most affluent region of the country. Only these additions, they argued, would justify the ecological damage done to the Melamchi river and the social ramifications of the water diversion. By tracing how this intervention was rendered unrealistic, I argue for an understanding of the hydrosocial (e.g. Banister, 2014; Clark et al., 2017; Linton and Budds, 2014; Swyngedouw et al., 2002) that is able to account for a diverse set of knots in a meshwork of entangled entities (Ingold, 2011) , some of which are human (e.g. politicians and activists) or supra-human (e.g. local communities, government agencies, international donor agencies and diplomacy), while others are decidedly non-human (water and rock).
Through an ethnographic engagement with this infrastructural meshwork (Author, forthcoming), I aim to explain why it will take at least twenty years to build a water conduit to mitigate Kathmandu's water shortage.
Kathmandu's water trouble and the anthropology of suspension
So far, the suspension of large-scale infrastructures has attracted little attention in social science literature. To be sure, there are examples of abandoned state projects (e.g. Author, 2012; Ghosh, 2006; Ghosh 2006; Krause, 2014; Latour 1996) , but the condition of suspension itself has so far not been properly conceptualized. Akhil Gupta (2015) recently pointed out this lack of engagement when he claimed that suspension, instead of being a temporary phase between the start of a project and its (successful) conclusion, needs to be theorized as its own condition of being. The temporality of suspension is not between past and future, between beginning and end, but constitutes its own ontic condition just as surely as does completion.
A field of anthropological inquiry that might help frame suspension is recent scholarship on the politics of hope and waiting (e.g. Andersson, 2015; Cross, 2014; Hage, 2016; Kleist and Jansen, 2016; Mains, 2012) . These contributions focus on the production of inequality by sentencing people to waiting: the unemployed, the poor, or illegal immigrants. In Gisa Weszkalnys's case, the citizens of São Tomé and Príncipe wait for an oil boom that does not materialize. Her work reminds us that waiting, speculation and anticipation are different things. Their experience strongly depends on the socioeconomic position of a person, as to "anticipate is not simply to expect; it is to realize that something is about to happen and, importantly, to act on that premonition" (Weszkalnys, 2014: 212) .
In Kathmandu, too, the burden of dealing with water scarcity is shared very unevenly by different socioeconomic groups in the city, but it serves to gloss over uneven access to infrastructures and resources through evoking a sentiment of shared suffering. Sure enough, nobody in the city has access to an uninterrupted and safe water supply. At the same time, members of affluent households do not have to invest their time into getting water as they employ domestic servants who deal with the banality of hydrosocial work. Paradoxically, and similarly to the scarcity of electricity 2 , the water situation is framed in a way that allows the elites to sustain the unfinished promise of equal access through citizenship in a "new Nepal 3 " built on hydraulic wealth. In the narrative of politicians, entrepreneurs and many opinion pieces published in the national media, this promise is within reach, just beyond the horizon; yet it remains constantly elusive.
Although residents have been made to wait for Melamchi for one generation now -some friends of mine who are in their thirties say: "I grew up with that scheme" -their everyday lives are far removed from passive idleness. Getting "government water" is not an easy task, as I have experienced over the last years whenever I stayed with friends in the neighborhoods of Jhochhen, Bouddha and Sanepa.
Due to chronic water shortage, the municipal water supplier Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani Limited (Kathmandu Valley Drinking Water Limited [KUKL] ) was able to provide its customers with water for only a few hours once every two to four days. This water was unsafe to drink because of high concentrations of arsenic, ammonia, iron, nitrates, and Coliform bacteria (Pant, 2011; Shrestha et al., 2016; Udmale et al., 2016) . In 2017, this timing was subject to constant change; although KUKL has tried for several years to come up with a reliable water schedule, it had so far failed to do so. Therefore, in order to find out when a particular neighborhood would be supplied with water, residents had to rely on experience, hearsay and individual community member's connections to the water institution.
When there was water, most people used electric pumps to pump it into underground or rooftop water tanks -as long as electricity was available. It is practically impossible to run a household in Kathmandu without private water storage facilities. Here, getting water is complicated and timeconsuming hydrosocial work. Even more dramatically, KUKL has declared some neighborhoods at higher elevations as "dry zones" that cannot be provided with piped water at all and rely solely on municipal water tankers (see figure   1 ). The official reason for this is a lack of pressure in the system that is caused by the generally bad condition of the bulk distribution network. Holes in pipes lead to major leakage. Approximations of water loss vary greatly: while the municipal water agency reports its loss at 20% (Udmale et al., 2016: 196) , independent water experts estimate this number to be at least 50% (Interviews, Kathmandu, 2015) , which would be in line with findings of European consultancy firms from the 1990s (Himal, 1992) . As mentioned earlier, the piped water is of very poor quality. Higher quality water is provided by private companies that deliver water in tankers (Shrestha and Shukla, 2014) . Drinking water is sold in 20 liter bottles delivered on pickup trucks and bicycles. Therefore, in many households, three different kinds of water are used side by side: "government water," "tanker water," and "drinking water." These waters are used for different purposes. Notably, they stem from different property regimes: whereas piped water (government water) is provided by KUKL (a public-private partnership), most of the tanker and all of the bottled water is provided by private companies. Some households still use water from private wells. However, the wells are running dry at an alarming rate that shows the dramatic depletion of the water table. This is also true for most of the pre-modern communal wells and sunken baths that used to supply the neighborhoods of the old towns of Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktapur. In short, because Kathmandu's water infrastructure is so complex, it can be a constant reason for frustration to the city's inhabitants. Acquiring water means a lot of work for them. The scarcity and irregularity of water supply has led to the privatization of a substantial part of the city's water infrastructure (roof-top tanks, water tankers, drinking water containers and dispensers) and requires constant, mostly individualized hydrosocial work of supply management. This is of course a widespread phenomenon in most of the world as the recent literature on water, infrastructures and the politics of citizenship in late liberalism illustrates (e.g. Anand 2017; Björkmann 2015; von Schnitzler 2016).
A radically changed waterscape
What differentiates Kathmandu from Mumbai, Soweto and other places with irregular water supply is the specific impasse the MWSP produces, with the solution always just beyond reach. Also in contrast to those cities and many other postcolonial settings, the Kathmandu Valley has a long history of largescale and communally managed urban water infrastructures (Bell, 2014; Pradhan, 1990) . In barely two generations, urbanization and population increase have radically transformed Kathmandu's waterscape.
In the 1970s, the valley still was an agriculturally intensely used peasant landscape, a mosaic of urban centers, forests, pastures, wet and dry fields, with hardly any paved roads. Over at least 1500 years of urban settlement, inhabitants had developed an elaborate system of water supply and sewage management that was maintained through the active engagement of a multiplicity of communities and more-than-human entities that held together through elaborate ritual practice and fell into disrepair with the advent of 'modern' water infrastructures beginning in the 1950s (Shrestha, 2014). This was a very different form of hydrosociality compared to the highly individualized 'modern' water labor described above. A friend in his forties who had grown up in the neighborhood of Jhochhen on the southern fringe of Kathmandu's old town told me that when he as a boy he frequently bathed in the Bishnumati river five minutes down the hill from the city's main square. The riverbanks were also prime sites for temples. While many of these complexes still exist, today Kathmandu's rivers are first
and foremost an open sewage system and an extended landfill, interspersed with informal settlements (Rademacher 2011). The ADB-funded Bagmati River Basin Improvement Project aims to chance this state. The addition of 170m liters of water per day once the Melamchi tunnel will be constructed is considered a precondition for a substantial "improvement" of Kathmandu's rivers. In both cases, as in practically every intervention promising development, the country's dependence on foreign funding, expertise and institutions becomes painfully obvious.
As mentioned, plans to supply the growing capital with out-of-valley raw water sources date back to the early 1980s, but as with many inter-basin water projects, from the beginning these ideas were highly contentious. Over a decade ago, Whittington et al. (2004: 158-159 ) summarized critique of the communities (Pokharel, 2010; Sharma, 2001) . The chosen protest forms -roadblocks and padlocking the project office, often for months on end -are reminiscent of measures that, according to Partha Chatterjee (2002), members of the political society take. In his discussion of the 'politics of the governed' he argued that most people in the global South do not partake in civil society and are instead managed as populations that are only mobilized for electoral campaigns. However, when such populations begin to state their own demands on the state, "many of the mobilizations […] are founded on a violation of the law" (Chatterjee, 2002: 177) .
Simultaneously with these interventions by the inhabitants of the Melamchi Valley, a different group of people became involved with the project that, following Chatterjee, can be termed as civil society actors in the narrow sense of term: urban, highly educated and globally connected 'activist-engineers.'
To Gopal, their engagement was the most remarkable aspect of Melamchi. Initially, they had been highly critical of the project, but confronted with the determination of the government and the international donor community, they decided to work on their own project design that actually called for a massive extension of the project. In Gopal's words: "Think about it: whereas these guys have always been highly critical of the projects proposed by the government and major donors, in this case they took a somewhat opposite stand and said: if we have to endanger the Melamchi watershed for the sake of bringing water to Kathmandu, then let's at least make sure that we make the most of it" (Interview, Kathmandu, 2015) .
Three days later, I met with Robert who had been one of the proponents of this group. When, in 1998, it became clear that the ADB would provide funding, a group of locals and foreigners came together in Kathmandu to propose a multi-purpose project, integrating two hydropower plants and an irrigation project. The whole scheme included five more tunnels (accounting altogether to more than 55 kilometers). "The plan was to refinance the water project through the sale of the electricity generated and our economic analysis showed that at the rate of the power purchase agreements the Khimti and Bhote Kosi hydropower projects 5 were guaranteed this was absolutely possible. And then there was the added benefit of the irrigation project downstream. We thought no one could say no to this. Everybody we talked to liked it, the National Planning Commission, the Minister [of Water Resources and Irrigation]" (Interview, Kathmandu, 2015) . They even managed to establish a consortium to finance the project, mostly with private and institutional investors from Nepal and Europe. But, according to Robert, the Finance Ministry was against it. The ADB had signaled that they wanted to fund Melamchi and the Ministry did not want to complicate relations with the powerful bank.
Gopal had identified another strong opposition to the multipurpose proposal: the officials in the Ministry of Physical Planning and Works. In his understanding, they wanted their own project. "They didn't want to share the project with the Ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation. And they managed to convince the ADB officials that a multipurpose Melamchi was way too complex to pull off" (Interview, Kathmandu, 2015) . An ADB officer responsible for Melamchi told me something similar when asked about the multipurpose idea: "See how much trouble we have doing the singlepurpose project? Doing a multi-purpose Melamchi would be impossible" (Interview, Kathmandu, 2014) . There was no alternative to Melamchi, the powers that be said, despite dozens of other options that were discussed and dismissed. On 8 May 2007, Yami announced that she would postpone the award of the contract. Although the ADB threatened to drop the project altogether, if no deal was reached within a week, the government let that ultimatum pass without action. STWI pulled out a week later after it had already extended the deadline for the award nine times. Yami's argument was two-fold: first, she doubted the tendering process whose four rounds, according to her, had only attracted bids from one company. Second, STWI had recently been under severe criticism for their management of municipal water supplies both in Guyana and in the UK (Gillespie et al., 2014) . Instead of full privatization, the Minister suggested to create a public-private partnership to manage the Melamchi water -a surprisingly un-Maoist proposition, one might concede. Many of the Maoist suggestions during the first two years of the peace process were careful not to contradict the party's general attempt to convince the international community of their turn towards multi-party democracy and capitalism.
A second reason for Yami's resistance can be excavated from the anonymous quotes from an ADB official published in a magazine article (Khadka, 2007) : "'It's schooling time for them,' one said, 'we have waited long enough, it's time to learn to play by the rules.' […] 'If we listen to what Yami is saying, tomorrow we will have to listen to another disgruntled minister of another party, and it would go on like that forever,' said the official from Manila." Not surprisingly, her attempt to establish a primacy of politics did not go down well with the ADB's technocrats. But once again, Melamchi showed remarkable resilience. Politicians, water experts and the foreign donor community still agreed on the assumption that there was simply no alternative. Thus, the ADB came around: the project was restructured and the loan agreement amended. Surprisingly, one of the main changes was the creation of KUKL that since 2007 runs the water infrastructure of the Kathmandu valley. Officially, it represents indeed, as Yami had demanded, a public-private partnership. 6 It seems even the ADB had realized by that time that the cases of full water privatization from Latin America and the UK were not as successful as free-market liberals had promised (Assies, 2003; Bakker, 2005) . Still, the ADB is far from happy with KUKL's performance thus far. In an interview, an ADB official called the water distribution institution the weakest link in the whole project design, doubting a lasting impact of all the money the bank had invested in capacity building over the last seven years (Interview, Kathmandu, 2015) .
So far, I have described the political and infrastructural factors in the suspension of the project. The last major delay happened in 2015. It shows the necessity of extending the analysis of infrastructural meshworks beyond the limited scope of human agency. While the two catastrophic earthquakes (Author, 2017; Ghale, 2015) in April and May had done relatively little damage to the building site, the de-facto Indian blockade of Nepal later that year led to a severe shortage in fuel, concrete and other building materials that lasted for about six months and resulted in another extended building freeze of Melamchi tunnel construction. Looking at the larger picture, however, I believe that the embargo was an indirect outcome of the earthquakes. Only four months after these devastating events, the Constituent Assembly ratified a new constitution that had been in the making for seven years. It was widely criticized for several reasons, most importantly its discriminatory provisions concerning citizenship rights of children of Nepalese mothers with foreign fathers (Thapa, 2015) . Consecutively major riots broke out in the country's south where cross-border marriages are widespread, resulting in at least 45 deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2015) . Local activists erected road blocks at the most important border crossings and threatened to set on fire any vehicle defying their blockade. The stated aim of the road block was to cut off the hill region and especially Kathmandu from vital supplies, most importantly fossil fuels. Unhappy with a number of provisions in the new constitution and concerned that the unrest might spill over into the Indian state of Bihar where local elections were imminent, the Indian government did nothing to solve the conflict and customs officials stopped working. This turned a protest of members of the political society into an unofficial trade embargo enforced by a regional power on a much weaker sovereign neighbor (Jha, 2015) .
But why do I claim a connection between the embargo and the earthquakes? Because without the earthquakes it is highly unlikely that the new constitution would have been ratified at that moment, let alone this version of it. After years of stalemate between the three major political parties, civil society, the UN and foreign diplomacy in the process of writing a constitution for the newly declared Republic of Nepal (Snellinger, 2015) , the earthquake and the ensuing chaos opened the possibility for antisecular and nationalistic factions to push their version of the document through and secure a twothirds majority in the Constituent Assembly (Lal, 2018; Lord and Moktan, 2017) . Even though the earthquakes did not damage the tunnel, the conflicts around the constitution and the Indian blockade, they severely delayed the project once again. 
Built through sand: Matter beyond easy control
Beyond the political ramifications of events like earthquakes (Simpson, 2013) I argue that we must "attend to the resistance of matter to political control" (Barry, 2001: 26) if we attempt to take the hydrosocial seriously. In the case of Melamchi, the most difficult matter has proven not to be water, but rock -or, to be more precise, the lack of solid rock. Over the last three years, I have made several trips to both ends of the tunnel -Melamchi, where the water will be diverted from, and Sundarijal, where it will enter the Kathmandu valley. The end of the tunnel is directly adjacent to the water treatment plant that will process all the arriving water from Melamchi into water that is safe for drinking.
During one of my visits to the Sundarijal site, I made the acquaintance of Giorgio, the engineer in charge of this stretch of tunneling works. He started our conversation by telling me that he had a very difficult time at the construction site that day. As so often it had to do with the precarious safety situation in the tunnel and his perception that the Nepali construction workers were not trained to assess their own safety properly. Over espresso, Giorgio identified the bad rock quality as the main cause for the dangerous work environment:
"Most of the time we dig in [rock] class 4b, 4c, or even 5. Class 5 is practically sand. So we need a lot of time and money to secure the tunnel. We need a lot of steel, but the [Melamchi Water Supply] Board doesn't want to pay for it. And my company is also unhappy, because I don't meet the daily target of 10 meters. But I cannot risk the life of my workers.
[…] if there is an accident, there will be a huge strike. And CMC [his company] also has a reputation to lose, it's been around for a hundred years. If we Italians build something, it will hold" (Interview, Sundarijal, 2016).
To many inhabitants of Kathmandu and members of the international donor community, digging a 28-kilometer tunnel seemed laughable from a technical perspective. After all, the Swiss had opened the 20k-Simplon tunnel already in 1906. But comparing projects like this was highly questionable, many engineers told me. Gopal, not at all a supporter of Melamchi, said: "Even in the Alps, there is only a handful of tunnels of that length. And obviously the main issue defining the difficulty of a project is the rock quality. We know that this is an issue all over the Himalayas: you never know what you get until you actually start digging" (Interview, Kathmandu, 2014) . According to Krishna Kanta Panthi and Bjørn Nilsen (2007: 174) , the complex geological setup of the Himalayas poses great challenges in tunneling, due to active tectonic movement which creates deformed and weathered rock masses. This has resulted in a situation where the "majority of tunnelling carried out in the Himalaya has suffered severe stability problems, resulting in delayed completion and cost overruns" (Panthi, 2006: 1-7). (Shrestha, 2015a; 2015b) . According to Giorgio, the Chinese company had done a very bad job; he was surprised that there had been no fatalities over the course of this partnership. He also blamed part of the delay his company had already incurred on the need to reinforce the insufficient steelwork implemented by the Chinese.
But his wrath didn't end there. When I asked him about the other parties involved in the project he simply replied: "Absolute zeros." In his account, the Indian company responsible for the construction of the adjacent water treatment plant only worked three or four days a week for a few hours 7 while the MWSB was mostly concerned with slowing down progress on all fronts. But most annoying to Giorgio were the Spanish consultants who audited the work he did. "They don't know anything about excavation work and normally arrive a day late. Then they often reclassify the rock quality down. I'm left with the costs for the more expensive safeguards and I have to fight it through with my management." Although breach of contract negotiations had already started between his company and the Board, Giorgio was confident that the tunneling works would be completed within a year. It took them 21 months, but in December 2016, the section he was working on was indeed completed (Subedi, 2016) .
The resistance of matter to technological control matters. Civil engineering in many places and contexts is fundamentally about dealing with recalcitrant matter. As recent investigations in science and technology studies and anthropology have shown, engineers are very much aware of the continuous unfinishedness of their work. Not only do they know about the constant need for maintenance, they also see their work essentially as a form of improvisation. Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox (2015: 198) , in their discussion of roads in Peru, come up with an apt term for this: the engineer-bricoleur. The engineer, they argue, is actually a bricoleur in Levi-Strauss's sense who has to work "with what comes to hand to resolve the specific and localized problems that any infrastructural project produces." Through the physical construction of things like roads or tunnels, civil engineers are those who translate the planner's normative philosophy of 'as if' into their pragmatic philosophy of 'as long as' (Harvey and Knox, 2015: 90) . In this vein, once completed, only time will tell how long the tunnel will hold or how much of the water that enters in Melamchi will actually exit in Kathmandu.
At the same time, Giorgio's account illuminates the inherently political nature of his everyday work through its entanglement with a multiplicity of entities concerned with their own conflicting agendas.
This resonates with a point Martin Reuss (2008: 531) made when he argued that "engineers often spend more time negotiating than building." For the time being, the example of Melamchi shows that for the engineers involved, however difficult it might be to control matter, dealing with the institutional politics of infrastructure construction tends to be much more challenging and timeconsuming.
Conclusion
For a generation, Melamchi has entangled a host of uneven entities in a meshwork of hydrosocial work. Its constant postponement has not only led to vast amounts of frustration among Kathmandu's inhabitants, a severe decrease of legitimacy for the state and lucrative contracts for mostly foreign corporations, but has also contributed to a wide-spread phenomenon around water infrastructures in Nepal; the condition Jane Guyer (2007) has termed "the evacuation of the near future:" because of the promise of Melamchi, many small-and medium-scale solutions -tackling leakage in the existing system, rainwater harvesting, measures to increase the recharge of the aquifer during monsoon seasons, the enactment of regulations against drilling ever deeper wells, etc. -have not been implemented, because from the future anterior (Povinelli, 2011) perspective of a finished Melamchi, these measures would have been an unnecessary waste of time and money. At the same time, this mobilization of future wealth justifies the suffering that people endure because of the lack of infrastructure. Paradoxically, it is a major building block for the unfinished promise of a Nepal that -one day -will have become wealthy because of its water resources. This is why, following Wittfogel, I have come to understand Nepal through the figure of the hydraulic state. Not, however, in his imagination of totalitarian rule through the control of water, but contrarily as an unfinished hydraulic state that promises future wealth through the monetization of water but perpetually fails to complete the infrastructures necessary to fulfill this promise. In the eyes of its citizens, the inability to complete these infrastructures leads to a growing frustration with multi-party democracy often backed by personal experience of state inefficiency due to rampart corruption and nostalgia for the days of autocratic monarchy. Yet, public opinion is also reluctant to let go of the promise of future hydraulic wealth and the fantasy of a good life enfolded into it. As with Melamchi, many people understand that, however unrealistic the promise, there is no alternative narrative for a prosperous future remotely as convincing. Simultaneously, they know that their aspirations are held in suspense by a complex meshwork of institutions and corporations that for the most part are not accountable to them. They also understand that in the end they will pay the bill for those long-delayed interventions. Analyzing the capital flows connected to large-scale infrastructure construction in the global South over the last decades, Nicholas Hildyard (2016) has called this process a form of "licensed larceny". In line with this, I propose to put Wittfogel's central concept from its head to its feet and understand oriental despotism today as the way how Western donors and corporations set the rules for most of world. In this reading, oriental despotism is a form of despotic rule over the orient. The unrealized story of the Multi-purpose Melamchi proposal shows how actually existing alternatives are rendered unrealistic through a coalition of government and donor agencies, political parties, consultancy and engineering corporations that compete for projects, funding, and kick-backs. In this meshwork, the simple plan to install a hydropower turbine at the end of a water diversion tunnel has become a pipe dream. 
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